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6 Straddling the region and the
world
Brazil's dual foreign policy comes of age
Andrés Malamud and Júlio César Cossio Rodriguez
As Brazil goes, so will go the rest of that L¡tin American Continent.
(Richard Nixon, American president, December 7 , l97l)
During the Lula administration, South America will be our priority.
(Celso Amorim, Brazilian foreign minister, January I, 2003)
Since 2008, the BRICs have been the main alliance for Brazil, at least regarding
the G-20 and the IMF. I emphasize: much more important than any other Latin
American countries.
(Paulo Nogueira Batista, IMF executive director, December I 8, 201 2)
Introduction
Even before it became an independent country in 1822, what is currently Brazil
sat uncomfortably in its region and felt threatened by its neighbors. Hence, it
looked first to the UK and then to the US as counterweights. This began to
change during the post-World War II period, when Southern Cone cooperation
was first attempted. The rapprochement with Argentina in the 1980s made it pos-
sible to overcome rivalry and suspicion and replace it with cooperation. In the
two decades following the creation of the Common Market of the South (Merco-
sur, established in l99l), Brazilcame increasingly to be seen as a regionalleader
and intermediate power (Lima and Hirst 2006). Yet, rather unexpectedly, Btazil
has ended up achieving less in the region and more in the world than both its
foreign policy architects and most independent observers had foreseen. At
present, Brazil is a regional power whose international ambitions do not always
command the support of its neighbors but which nevertheless has become more
visible and commanded a stable presence in key global negotiations. Unlike
other states that straddle regional subsystems, Brazil stands astride a (changing)
region and the world at large. To manage this duality, its leaders initially
designed a sequential foreign policy that conceived region-building as a means
to attain global recognition. However, recurring regional setbacks and unex-
pected global achievements led to a policy reformulation, and actions at both
levels have gained autonomy from each other. A dual foreign policy has thus
--7-
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gained a foothold, as Brazil has begun to act as a stabilizing peer in Latin
America and as an assertive power on the global stage (Lechini and Giaccaglia
20 l0; Malamud 201 I ; Spektor 2009; see also Pinheiro 2000).
Brazil is among those states that have various identities: it is an emerging
market, a continental power (also called a "monster country"), a Latin (or lately
South) American country, and a member of the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia,
India and China). Yet it stands alone in several significant respects 
- 
situated in
a predominantly Spanish-speaking region, its language is Portuguese; among
both the established and emerging big powers, it is the only one that has neither
nuclear arms nor nuclear-armed neighbors; and in a world of growing rivalry
and competition, it boasts that it has no foes. Because of these characteristics, it
is regarded as the quintessential soft power (Sotero and Armijo 2007). However,
its foreign policy changes according to issue and audience; it can be defiant with
the United States, accommodating with lran, and generous with Bolivia. The
main contrast concerns Brazil's position in its region and in the world 
- 
in the
former it sells itself as a peer or a broker, but not as a leader, and even less a
hegemon; in the latter it fights for every leading position that opens up 
- 
be it a
permanent seat at the UN Security Council or the General Directorship of the
World Trade Organization (WTO).
This altemation between humility and ambition is just one of the many mani-
festations of Brazil's diplomatic ambiguity. The paramount illustration is its stance
towards regionalism; while national leaders vocally support regional integration,
in practice they have never provided it with more than token backing. Likewise,
Brazil's definition of its region varies; it is "South America" when it needs to
secure a manageable area beyond the US economic and security perimete¡ but it
may tum to "Latin America" when bidding for a position in an international organ-
ization. This Janus-like strategy places Brazil simultaneously on severalstages and
obliges it to articulate diverse, sometimes even opposing views and interests. This
qualifies the country as a Cusp State, i.e., one that lies on the edge of and in an
ambivalent relationship with regions that are seen to function as an intemational
relations subsystem. Only in this case, the regions are fuz4 and overlapping, and
the global stage adds still another gravitational force.
The fuzziness of the "home region" stems not from any objective nebulosity
regarding the contiguous area, but from Brazil's deliberate decision to redraw
boundaries according to its varying interests. By contrast, Brazil's additional
source of international identity does not come from another regional grouping
but from its self-identity as a global power in its own right 
- 
inespective of
regional opinion. In any case, Brazil's position on the cusp challenges previous
expectations that it would become a regional leader. As it turns out, the region is
not its ultimate priority, and its neighbors sometimes resent its ambiguity
(Malamud 201l).
This chapter begins by introducing the historical and strategic context to show
how Brazil is unique in the region. It then discusses the changing nature and
declining relevance of the region for Brazil's foreign policy goals, and subse-
quently explains how this middle power transformed itself into an (aspiring)
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global power. The final section concludes with some reflections on this non-
standard case of cuspness.
Historical and strategic context
Brazil is a global giant. The fifth largest country in the world by area and popu-
lation, and the seventh in terms of economic size, it is the only one in its class.
Unlike the other BRICS, it does not have 
- 
nor, according to its constitution,
does it aspire to 
- 
nuclear weapons.r It enjoys internationally agreed and stable
borders and has had a largely peaceful historical record since the end of the nine-
teenth century. And unlike the Spanish American countries that surround it,
Brazil never split up territorially, its political transitions have been mostly mild
- 
from slavery to abolition, from empire to republic and from dictatorship to
democracy 
- 
and its domestic affairs have been traditionally managed through
negotiation rather than confrontation.
Although Brazil defines itself as a "peaceful country" (Ministério da Defesa
do Brasil 2008), and assefts that the peaceful resolution of conflict is an essential
component of its foreign policy, it has not always been reluctant to use force. In
the nineteenth century it conquered vast territories and engaged ¡ryice in major
wars 
- 
first against Argentina over what is now Uruguay; and then, jointly with
Argentina and Uruguay, against Paraguay. In the twentieth century it made peace
within the region, only to become the one Latin American country to take part in
both world wars 
- 
always alongside the US. By chance or design, this warring
path anticipates the argument presented in this chapter 
- 
Brazil's international
trajectory is characterized less by the peacefulness of its means and more by the
slow walk it has taken away from the region on to the global stage.
As regards Brazilian security traditions, the paramount factor is the absence
of strategic enemies. In the early days, the UK shielded Brazil from extra-
regional threats following independence from Portugal, a role that has been
taken up by the US in the twentieth century. Brazil's commitment to non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries was born out of its security
perceptions in this context (Proença Jr. and Diniz2009). But having no enemies
does not necessarily mean the absence of conflict. Indeed, trans-border issues
such as drug+rafficking and arms-smuggling are increasingly sensitive. Other
non-military troubles have sporadically emerged in the neighborhood, such as
the negative spillover of domestic instability in contiguous states, or the hostile
nationalization of Brazilian state utilities.
The absence of enemies, together with the absence of regional nuclear
powers, has created a relatively secure environment in which transnational crime
is a more pressing issue than strategic threats. As a consequence, Brazil's stra-
tegic culture has turned towards the protection of its vast territory and natural
resources from intrusion by extra-regional powers (Silva Filho and Moraes
2010). These are never officially named, but ofÊthe-record statements point
unequivocally to the US as the greatest source of concem. This applies particu-
larly to Amazonia but also to the so-called Blue Amazonia aÍea 
- 
Brazil's
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immense sea shelf and the area of its oil reserves. The White Book on National
Defense, issued for the first time in 2012, reflects the country's overlapping
defense, security and development concerns (Ministério da Defesa do Brasil
2012). lndeed, development is as high a priority for defense strategists as it is for
diplomats and statesmen, to the detriment of other foreign and security goals
(Almeida 2010).
The amalgamation of defense, security and development concems hinders the
construction of an agenda with clearly defined priorities. Hence, the White Book
lists as key areas the following: the "two" Amazonias, the South Atlantic Ocean
and the west shore of Africa. In addition to the assignment of responsibility over
geographic areas, functional responsibilities are assigned to the military 
- 
the air
force is in charge of controlling the airspace over Green Amazonia, and space
projects; the army is responsible for border control and localized intervention in
the hinterlands, as well as in cyberspace; and the navy remains in command of
Blue Amazonia and its pre-salt oil resources, as well as the country's nuclear
development and its crown jewel, the planned nuclear-powered submarine.
In spite of its vast territory and extensive borders, and its military's ambition
notwithstanding, Brazil is a lightweight in terms of military spending (Figure
6.1). Current foreign minister Antonio Patriota claims that this is a consequence
of'a great advantage' that Brazil enjoys 
- 
unlike the other BRICs, or any ofthe
world's traditional major powers, he says, 'we have no real enemies, no battles
on our borders, no great historical or contemporary rivals among the ranks of the
other important powers ... and long-standing ties with many of the world's
emerging and developed nations'(cited in Rothkopf 2012).
Brazil's dualforeign policy I l5
As Sotero and Armijo (2007) have noted, Brazil is one of the few countries to
stake, effectively, its future on soft power, based primarily on diplomacy, on the
wise use of its cultural charm, and on its growing role as a facilitator and a force
of cooperation. Successive administrations havg put diplomacy to profitable use,
translating scale into influence. They have seated Brazil at every negotiation table
to address issues as diverse as climate change, world trade, non-proliferation,
and cooperation for development. As is proudly said in ltamaraty, the foreign
ministry palace, Brazil has a "diplomatic GDP" that exceeds its economic one;
in other words it can punch above its weight because of the high quality of its
professional diplomacy.
During the twentieth century, Brazilian diplomacy unwaveringly defended
national sovereignty and advocated non-intervention. As such, it based its inter-
national action on two premises 
- 
the preservation of the country's autonomy
and the quest for development, the latter seen both as a goal in itself and as a
precondition for autonomy. While the concept of development - increasing
national capabilities through massive industrialization and the effective occupa-
tion of the territory 
- 
has remained relatively constant, the interpretation of auto-
nomy has varied over time according to contextual changes. These changes were
reflected in ideological controversies among the foreign policy elite (Pinheiro
2000; Saraiva 2010).
During the long period in which the region was considered a threat, autonomy
was sought through distance, and alliances with extra-regional powers were used
to balance regional rivals. Once Brazil had gained enough strength and selÊ
confidence and had begun to see the region as an opportunity, autonomy was
redefined in terms of parlicipalion (in multilateral organizations) or inlegration
(in regional blocs). Lately, though, increased national power and a growing per-
ception of the region as a burden has led to a search for autonomy thtough diver'
sifcation, which unofficially means the dilution of the region as a priority and
the formation of multiple international coalitions with other large states accord-
ing to issue and arena (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007). The relationship with the
US has changed, along with the conceptualization of autonomy. It has shifted
from straightforward alignment to relative estrangement, interspersed by spor-
adic skirmishes and rapprochements (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006; Amorim
Neto 20ll). In allthis, the role of civil society has remained negligible, and the
handling of foreign policy as a monopoly of professional diplomats and states-
men has only recently began to recede (Cason and Power 2009).
Brazil's inclination towards multilateralism is reflected in its participation and
high profile in all significant international organizations, be they global, hemi-
spheric, regional or subregional. In the United Nations it has the privilege of
proffering the opening speech at the annual meeting of the General Assembly. In
the V/TO, it is one of the countries that most frequently and successfully uses
arbitration mechanisms (Hopewell 201l); in 2013 Brazilfinally managed to get
one of its senior diplomats appointed as director-general. lt is a member of the
Organization of American States (OAS) and has promoted other similarly tasked
but smaller associations such as the Rio Group. It is a founding member of the
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practically oriented Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and the
largely rhetorical Communify of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).
Closer to home, it promoted Mercosur, together with Argentina; was the demi-
urge behind the creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR);
and leads the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO). One of the ulti-
mate goals of such intense Brazilian activism is to gain a permanent seat in the
UN Security Council, if and when the latter's Charter is reformed.
Today, Brazil's international profile is probably at a historical high point.
There is hardly a coalition of emerging powers whose acronym is not headed by
the letter B, be it the BRICS, IBSA, or BASIC. However, hard data and several
world rankings show that the glittering image has yet to be matched by real
achievements. In 201 l, the country occupied l Sth position on the Elcano Global
Presence Index (IEPG), which measures the global positioning of different coun-
tries in the fields of economy, defense, migration and tourism, science and
culture, and development assistance.2 It occupied a slightly higher position
(ninth) on the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC), a statistical
measure of national power that uses an average of percentages of world totals in
six different areas covering demographic, economic and military strength.3
Although the World Bank ranked it seventh by GDP (at purchasing power
parity), Brazil was only 75th in terms of per capita CDP.4
The gap between modest achievements and a glamorous global image is
indicative of the limited resources that Brazilhas at its disposalto pursue devel-
opment and autonomy. A restricted military capacity, a commodity-based export
structure, and an underdeveloped and aging infrastructure, place tough con-
straints on the use of hard power (Rodriguez20l2). Soft power is also limited by
Brazil's relatively low level of technological development, whether measured by
the number of patents, the absence of universities at the top of global rankings,
or the lack of Nobel Prize winners. But Brazil has made up for these short-
comings by its charming image, the potential of which is unleashed by a com-
petent diplomatic corps, lately assisted by a "winning streak" in terms of
world-acclaimed presidents. The tensions between image and achievement, and
between regional and global goals have grown steadily over the last two decades,
nurturing a foreign policy bifurcation. It is precisely in this that Brazil's growing
cuspness resides.
The changing nature and declining pr¡ority of the region
Brazil's home region is not straightforward. To start with, this is the only former
colony ever to have hosted a European court 
- 
between I 808 and I 822 (with due
credit to the Peninsular Napoleonic invasions) the Portuguese empire was ruled
from Rio de Janeiro, not Lisbon. But this did not tum Brazil into a global power
or confer upon it a cosmopolitan sensibility. Its perceptions of the international
order were molded by two other factors: rivalry with its Spanish-American
neighbors in the struggle for tenitory and the establishment of stable borders;
and the threat posed by those European powers 
- 
mainly Britain 
- 
that wanted to
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end the slave trade. This situation had changed by the turn of the century, when
an "unwritten alliance" was allegedly forged with the US in order to counterbal-
ance Argentina (Burns 1966). This move defined Brazil's international identity
as Westem Hemispheric.
Brazil's conception of its surroundings suffered consecutive redefinitions
over time. Originally, pan-Americanism was seen as an instrument allowing the
US to counterbalance the threat from both Europe and the River Plate (Argen-
tina). This was what guided the actions of the Baron of Rio Branco, who led the
foreign ministry under four presidents between 1902 and 1912. Later on the
"pan" was dropped in favor of "Latin." In 1960 Brazil embraced the develop-
mentalist beliefs of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and
became a founding member of the Latin American Free Trade Association
(ALALC). However, for the general population and elites alike, Latin America
was seen as the region that surrounded Brazil rather than its home region.
After the democratization process of the 1980s, rapprochement with Argen-
tina led to the creation of Mercosur and the establishment of a security com-
munity in the Southern Cone (Hurell 1998). In the mid-1990s, the government
began to use the term "South America" to replace "Latin America" as the site of
Brazil's home region 
- 
or sphere of influence (Spektor 2010). A decade later,
strategic documents issued by the Lula and Rousseff administrations, including
the National Defense Strategy (Ministério da Defesa do Brasil 2008) and the
White Book (Ministério da Defesa do Brasil 2012), have gone even further.
They identifo an extended priority area: the South Atlantic. While the Latin
American label aimed to exclude the US, and the South American one served to
exclude Mexico, the South Atlanlic label is about securing control over natural
resources and consolidating Brazil's influence over the sea shelf and West
Africa. In this way Brazil has redrawn its region in order to fit its rising power
and ambitions. This degree of flexibility, which serves to deliberately promote
the inclusion and exclusion of other states, signals how little attachment Brazil-
ian elites feel towards a naturally or historically defined region.
Although Portugal's rivalry with Spain established a conflictive relation
between Brazil and the surrounding colonies from the outset, independence did
not improve Brazil's standing among its neighbors. By maintaining the empire
as the preferred form of state, and slavery as a mode of production, it parted
ways with the abolitionist republics that were popping up all around it. This
rivalry was apparent in the war waged against Argentina over modern Uruguay
in 182Ç27; but it was also more subtly manifested in bilateral and multilateral
relations. Take the Congress of Panama, which was organized by Simón Bollvar
in 1826 to bring together the new republics of the Americas and promote the
development of a unified policy towards Spain. The Congress proposed the cre-
ation of a league of American republics with a shared military force, a mutual
defense pact, and a supranational parliamentary assembly. It was attended by
representatives of Gran Colombia (comprising modern-day Colombia, Ecuador,
Panama and Venezuela), Peru, the United Provinces of Central America, and
Mexico. Chile and Argentina declined to attend because they were suspicious of
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Bolívar's influence. The Empire of Brazil did not send delegates as it expected a
hostile reception from its Spanish-American neighbors as a result of the ongoing
war with Argentina. lsolationist Paraguay was not invited. In the end, the grandly
titled "Treaty of Union, League, and Perpetual Confederation" that emerged
from the Congress was only ratified by Gran Colombia, and Bolívar's dream
soon foundered completely with the outbreak of civil war, the disintegration of
the Central American federation, and the emergence of national rather than con-
tinental outlooks among the newly independent American republics.
Economic regionalism emerged much later. The ALALC was founded in
1960 and then relaunched as ALADI in 1980 just before the third wave of demo-
cratization. Under the ALADI institutional umbrella, Mercosur was established
in 1991. An array of regional organizations were born in the 2000s, after the
crisis of neoliberalism and the rise of the Latin American left. While some of
these blocs have ideological or political motivations, such as the Venezuelan-led
Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) and UNASUR, others such as the Pacific Alliance
and the various bilateral or regional agreements with the US, the EU and Asian
countries focus on trade and markets.
In order to explain the differences among regional groupings, we used a
quantitative measure 
- 
the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) 
-
to assign an annual value to structural capabilities. We then analyzed the parti-
cipation of the countries of the Western Hemisphere in the creation of regional
organizations. Our preliminary results show that between the end of World War
ll and 2008, structural capabilities rather than ideological convergence or polit-
ical solidarity accounted for the relative success of integration initiatives, but
played an even stronger role in explaining their nature. In shott, the larger the
gap between the major power and the other members of a bloc, the more likely it
is that the former opts for non-sovereignty sharing cooperation arrangements as
exemplified by the US leadership in the foundation of the Organization of Amer-
ican States (OAS) in the 1940s or the Brazilian crafting of UNASUR in the
2000s. In contrast, when the gap is narrower 
- 
as between the US and Mexico or
between Brazil and Argentina in the 1990s 
- 
the costs of ceding national compe-
tencies are lower and integration treaties become more attractive 
- 
or less threat-
ening. Figure 6.2 shows how power gaps shape the nature of regional initiatives.
Across the region, non-complementary interests and changing relative power
gaps have generated a patchwork of overlapping projects with fuzzy boundaries
(Malamud and Gardini 2012). Indeed, there is no regional organization that
brings together all the Latin American countries exclusively: the OAS includes
Canada and the United States; the lbero-American Community includes Andorra,
Portugal and Spain; ALADI includes only l3 of the 20 Latin American States;
UNASUR unites ten of the latter as well as Guyana and Surinam; and processes
of subregional integration such as Mercosur, the Andean Community, and the
Central American Integration System are even less encompassing in terms of
membership. In addition to bringing together countries as disparate as poverty-
stricken Bolivia and wealthy Barbados, CELAC lacks any organizational struc-
ture or legal personality. Tacitly acknowledging this diversity, Celso Amorim
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Figure 6.2 Influence of power gaps on regional initiatives (source: Own elaboration
based on data from CINC (CoW, www.correlatesofwar.org). The arrows
show that higher power gaps are associated with cooperation agreements,
while lower gaps are associated with integration initiatives.)
(Lula's foreign minister between 2003 and 20ll) defined South America 
- 
not
Latin America 
- 
as Brazil's priority, and deeper integration as its main goal
(Amorim 2003). However, Brazil's leading role in the UN-sponsored Haiti sta-
bilizing mission (MINUSTAH) after2004, and its intervention in the 2009 Hon-
duran constitutional crisis, confused the definition of its home region, taking it
beyond South America 
- 
again.
Regional initiatives are limited by low levels of trade interdependence and
interconnectivity (due to large distances and poor infrastructure), and by the
attraction of extra-regional poles. All the South American economies are pre-
dominantly commodity-exporting, and their populations and resources 
- 
which
are spread along the Atlantic, Caribbean and Pacific shorelines but are very
sparse in the hinterlands 
- 
are oriented outward rather than in a neighborly direc-
tion. Cartographic projections tend to fool the untrained eye, but the Brazilian
city of Recife, in the north eastern state of Pernambuco, is significantly closer 
-
and better connected 
- 
to Dakar in Senegal than to Rio Branco, the capital ofthe
Brazilian state of Acre. Natural physical barriers are not to be underestimated,
and the Andes range and the Amazonian rainforest are certainly among the
world's largest. All this helps to explain why extra-regional relations are of
greater magnitude than political rhetoric can readily admit: China, the US and
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the EU are not only more complementary to the Brazilian economy than any of
its neighbors, they are atso frequently easier and cheaper to reach'
Brazil's rhetoric has not chánged much since the end of Lula's term in office.
In his swearing-in speech, Rousseff s foreign minister, Patriota (201l), reiter-
ated that Soutñ Rmèrica is Brazil's region of choice. However, Brazil's acts
belie his words. While symbolically reaffirming the strategic partnership with
Argentina and acknowleiging Mercosur as the country's chief international
pro]ect, the nature of that Uloð ttut been altered, moving away from its original
èconomic character towards a purely political instrumental role.
Twenty years after its foundation, Mercosur has failed to meet its declared
goals; however it has achieved other relevant - if tacit - aims. Although it is far
Irom being a common market, it has supported domestic democracy, backed eco-
nomic reform processes, and helped to consolidate a regional security community'
In practice, it is not yet a customs union or even a full-fledged free trade zone.
Impervious to the growing gap between treaties and achievements, regional elites
have responded to unattainèd goals by signing additional protocols, building up
new inoferative institutions, and engaging in rhetorical flourishes.
Mercosur's underlying formula - preferential access to the Brazilian market
in exchange for Argentini support for Brazil's intemational strategies - has run
out of steãm and has not been replaced (Bouzas et al.2002). In this context, the
bloc has a different meaning for each member state. Nonetheless, unlike the
Andean community, negotiations with the EU are still under way and the pos-
sibility of signing ã blo.-to-bloc agreement keeps Mercosur going. Enlargement
pro..du.., ñave not been straightforward either: Venezuela was a candidate
member for six years, as the accession protocol was blocked by the Paraguayan
senate, after whìch a sudden presidential impeachment in 2012 gave the other
members the excuse to suspend Paraguay's membership and consummate Vene-
zuela,s accession. Both thè suspension and the enlargement have been legally
contested; furthermore, Venezuela does not comply with most of the bloc's reg-
ulations, which only serves to highlight the growing dysfunctionality of the bloc
and the fuzziness of its boundaries and norms'
Mercosur is a case of supply-side integration, the particular dynamics of
which have been labeled inter-presidential' Inter-presidentialism refers to the
combination of an international strategy: presidential diplomacy - with a
domestic institution: presidentialism (Malamud 2005). While presidentialism
concentrates decision-making in the chief executive omce, presidential diplo-
macy means resorting to direct negotiations between presidents every time a
cruc-ial decision has to be made, or a critical conflict resolved' Another way to
put it is that Mercosur has been power-oriented rather than rule-oriented since its
birth. M.r"o.ur's top dispute settlement institutions have been called upon to act
l6 times in 2l years. Legal institution-building is precarious, as it is not a result
of functional needs bui of pressure from epistemic communities and trans-
national networks.
Likewise, even if the development of a parliamentary institution can be
understood as a legitimizing resource born out of mimicry and isomorphism
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(RiilandandBechle20ll),Mercosur'sparliamentaryassembly(PARLASUR)is
more accurately describeá as the outcome of sectoral lobbying by national legis-
iators ltvtatamú¿ an¿ Dri forthcoming). In fact, it has no legislative competences,
no ouàrrigltt capacities, no popular or demographic representation' and almost
no transnational PartY Politics'
ThedistinctivenessofMercosurvis-à-visotherregionalprojectslike
UNASURorALBAusedtobeitseconomicheft,butfromthe2000sthemain
function of the bloc for Brazil ceased to be the creation of a larger market and
became instead an instrument for the management of retations with Argentina
iùuifuáao 201l). Lately, even this function has lost steam because of Mercosur's
ànlargem"nt - hrst by éxtending membership to Venezuela' and 
the process is
currently under way as regardsÞolivia. This expansion process is diluting the
importance of the Argentiie-Brazilian axis, and Mercosur's new mission is to
fr"fp ,,uUifitt un unr,ily neighborhood by providing an arena for Brazilian offi-
cials to contain ano cá¡ote luaneling parties in adjacent countries, preventing
domestic or interstate squauËtrs from éscalating and spilling over to the rest of
the region.
AsSpektorargues(2010:203),Brasilianowseesregionalismasaforeign
poLicy instrumenland'not as an end in itself. Brazilian perceptions are still
,,dominated by the continuing power of a national ideology of autonomy, self-
rrrrp, áno .urpi.ion about nJighbours' intentions." unlike some European and
African cases, regionalism haJnot contributed to changing Brazil's international
iOentity. The cou-ntry interacts fluently with its neighbors but has no intention of
merging with them. Apart from stabilizing the region' its main goal is to use
regionatism to promåte investment and manufactured exports' "Strategic
puîirnr"," as Luia called it, has been deployed to deal with .resistance and
dissent. But Brazil is more assertive and sell-confident now than it was a decade
ugo,unoitcanthereforeaffordtobealittlelesspatient'This.shiftisapparentin
ízoot survey of the Brazilian foreign policy elite, which shows the declining
relevance of Mercosur when compar.¿ tô tt't. results of a previous survey canied
outin200l(Souza2009).Thesplitbetweenthosewhoconsideredtheregiona
priority and those who píeferreO ìo go global without a regional "stop-over" had
begun to emerge ttre yeãr before, *ñ"n u taskforce of distinguished scholars and
àiito*uo werã split over the issue (cEBRI-CINDES 2007). This cleavage will
likely become more accentuated in the coming years'
From regional to global Power
TwotrendsretevanttoBrazil'spositionintheregionandtheworldmaturedin
2010.First,ChinareplacedtheUSasBrazil'smaintradingpartner;second,
Brazilexportedmorecommoditiesthanmanufacturedgoodsforthe-firsttime
since 1978. Both trends are related. Brazilian growth during the last decade has
been the result of growing linkages with the most dynamic emerying markets'
ãrp""iu¡v china, b-ut thisias imposed a toll on its productive and_export struc-
ture. Recommoditization, which is tantamount to relative deindustrialization
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(Oreiro and Feijó 2010), has been an undesired but unavoidable consequence of
the role that Brazil plays in the new global economy. Although the country's
economy depends much less on the US than before, and certainly much less than
Mexico does, the outcome is not one that developmentalist elites, be they left- or
right-leaning, would have chosen for Brazil.
ln spite of its economic quandaries, the country has gained increasing global
recognition. Today, Brazil is acknowledged as a global player by the established
world powers. One of the factors that boosted its foreign reputation was its promo-
tion as a "BRIC" country. A Goldman Sachs 2001 report predicted that the com-
bined economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China would eclipse those of the
cunently richest counhies by 2050 due to their high growth rates. The report did
not advocate the creation of an economic bloc, but a few years later the BRIC coun-
tries sought to form a "political club" and to convert their growing economic clout
into greater geopolitical stature. By contrast, IBSA is a more limited and "principle-
oriented" grouping. This acronym refers to the trilateral developmental alliance
between India, Brazil and South Africa to promote South-South cooperation and
exchange. This group has been publicized as an initiative that brings together the
largest democracies on every continent of the Southern Hemisphere. lt therefore
more powerfully conveys Brazilian foreign policy banners such as democracy,
respect for human rights and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. lndeed, its main
strategic goal has been aptly defined as "soft balancing" (Flemes 2007).
Brazil has also been skilful in the realm of commercial negotiations. Although
the current WTO round has stagnated, a new collective actor, the Group of 20,
emerged from it. This bloc of 20 or so developing nations brings together 60
percent of the world's population, T0 percent of its farmers and26 percent of the
world's agricultural exports. lt dates back to June 2003, when the IBSA foreign
ministers signed the Brasília Declaration stating that the goal of the developing
countries was to promote the reversal of the protectionist policies and trade-
distorting practices of the developed countries. Their efforts bore fruit in 2008,
when the (albeit unsuccessful) Doha Round came to a close with febrile negoti-
ations between the United States, the European Union, plus lndia and Brazil.
The high profile of these and other emerging giants was confirmed at the Copen-
hagen Summit on Climate Change in December 2009,at which the leaders of
China, India, Brazil and South Africa (BASIC) negotiated the final declaration
with US president Barack Obama, without the participation the European Union,
Russia, Japan and other global powers. Irrespective of the meager results, parti-
cipation at these pinnacles of power is tantamount to peer recognition 
- 
a goal in
its own right (Nel 2010; Hurrell et a\.2000).
Brazil has also made it into the G-20 (not to be confused with the WTO
Group of 20), formally called the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors. This supersedes the G-8 and brings together l9 of the
world's largest national economies plus the European Union. Brasilia has played
a high profile role in its constitution and meetings.
Another key sign of international recognition as an emerging power was the
European Union's 2007 invitation to establish a "strategic partnership" with
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Brazil (Malamud2012). This is worth noting because the EU had been reluctant
to engage with other Latin American countries - especially those already clus-
tered in regional blocs 
- 
on an individual basis. The decision had two con-
sequences: on the one hand, it conferred upon Brazil the status given to other
emerging world powers with which the EU had already signed strategic partner-
ship agreements (China, lndia, Russia and South Africa); on the other hand, it
differentiated Brazil from the rest of Latin America and went against the pro-
claimed EU goal of engaging only in bloc+o-bloc negotiations with that region.
According to the EU, "[t]his new relationship places Brazil, the Mercosur region
and South America high on the EU's political map."s However, some of Brazil's
neighbors felt that they had been left out and that this move will further damage
the development of regional integration. Studying the formal document issued
by the European Commission helps inform the negative reaction from the other
countries of the region:
Over the last years, Brazil has become an increasingly significant global
player and emerged as a key interlocutor for the EU. However, until recently
EU-Brazil dialogue has not been sufficiently exploited and canied out
mainly through EU-Mercosur dialogue. Brazil will be the last 'BRICS' to
meet the EU in a Summit. The time has come to look atBrazil as a strategic
partner as well as a major Latin American economic actor and regional
leader.... Its emerging economic and political role brings new responsibil-
ities for Brazil as a global leader. The proposed strategic partnership
between Brazil and EU should help Brazil in exercising positive leadership
globally and regionally.. .. Over the last few years Brazil has emerged as a
champion of the developing world in the UN and at the WTO ... Brazil is a
vital ally for the EU in addressing these and other challenges in international
fora. A quasi-continent in its own right, Brazil's demographic weight and
economic development make it a natural leader in South America and a key
player in Latin America.... Positive leadership of Brazil could move
forward Mercosur negotiations.ó
Although the EU certainly did not intend to damage its relations with Mercosur,
its pompous rhetoric had negative repercussions in the region. By calling Brazil
a "regional leader," a "global leader," a "champion of the developing world," a
"quasi-continent in its own right," and a "natural leader in South America," it
provoked jealousies and harmed its own position as well as Brazil's standing
among the other countries of South America. Global ambitions, it seems, may
come at the detriment to regional achievements.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown how Brazil has become an atypical case within an atypi-
cal category: as a Cusp State it does not lie on the edge of, or in an ambivalent
relationship with, two regions; rather, it straddles a "shifting" region and the
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global system. In spite of its regional pre-eminence, Brazil has been unable to
translate its structural and instrumental resources into effective leadership. Its
potential regional followers have not backed its main foreign policy goals:
Argentina, colombia and Mexico refuse to support Brazil's long-standing bid
for a permanent seat in the uN Security council, and Brazilian candidates for
the directorship-general of the wro, and for the presidency of the Inter-
American Development Bank, were outvoted by other south American candidates
in 2005. Indeed, some of its neighbors have even challenged its materiar suprem-
acy by nationalizing Brazilian public enterprises or refusing to pay their debts to
Brazil's state-owned development bank. By playing the regional card to achieve
global ends, Brazil ended up in an unexpected situation 
- 
while its regional leader-
ship has grown on paper, it has been weakened in practice (Malamud 201l). Even
so, it has achieved growing global recognition, and Brazil is acknowledged as an
emerging global player by the world's established powers.
Over the last decades, successive Brazilian administrations altered their con-
ceptualization of their home region according to shifting geopolitical realities
and the transformation of the global political economy. As Brazil's power has
grown vis-à-vis its neighbors, it has felt less compelled to balance power rela-
tions via extra-regional alliances; and as its economic clout has developed, it has
become a global exporter and grown less dependent on surrounding states. while
the region was seen as a threat in the early 1900s and was recast as a resource in
the 1980s, in the 2000s key members of the foreign policy elite began to see it as
a burden. If this view gains ground, it may be concluded that the region was only
a temporary "stopover" on the path to global power, gradually shifting from
being seen as an enabling tool to a hindrance. The invention of south America
(as opposed to Latin America) represented a step back that allowed Brazil to
take two steps forward (onto the global stage). But Brazil is still caught in the
middle of that path, as fully delinking from the region seems neither possible nor
desirable.
The challenge for Brazilian foreign policy is to adapt to a world of declining
Western hegemony and fragmenting Latin American interests. The country may
face difficult choices, as global multipolarity and regional divergences grow.
Should Brazil accept a global order that is beginning to include it, or challenge it
for being still too exclusive? should it invest in regional leadership or build
broader alliances irrespective of geography?
Three scenarios loom ahead, which can be labeled reformist, revisionist and
regional. In the first, Brazil articulates its positions within existing international
institutions (the UN, the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank, among others). In
the second, Brazil adopts a flexible strategy of alliances with other emerging
powers as embodied by groups such as BRICS and IBSA, with the purpose of
mobilizing the Global South against the order established by the developed
countries. In the third scenario, Brazil acts as a regional leader that articulates
south (or Latin) American interests and represents them in international fora.
Although the official rhetoric suggests a combination of the second and third
scenarios, the trends outlined here suggest that Brazilian foreign policy will
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consist of an amalgam of all of three. The country will most likely oscillate
between (reluctant) alignment with the current global leader 
- 
the US 
- 
and its
main putative challenger 
- 
China 
- 
while working to keep its home region quiet.
To use Schweller's metaphor (1994: 103), Brazil will act like a jackal, which is
"often found trailing wolves (revisionist leaders), [but it] will also trail lions
(status quo leaders) who are on the verge of victory." This riding on another's
coat-tails is consistent with Brazilian reluctance to pay the costs of regional inte-
gration and its unwillingness to invest in hard power 
- 
mainly military 
-
resources. Brazil's balancing act continues, therefore, only this time oscillating
between two superpowers rather than between its home region and the world
(Rodriguez 20 I 2).
Brazil's century-long joumey has taken it from being an overtly Cusp State to
becoming a core state (in Latin America) and then a putative leader (in South
America) to returning to its status as a Cusp State, only now covertly. What
changed over this evolution was its absolute and relative power: once a periph-
eral producer of desserts (coffee, sugar and cacao), Brazil has slowly become a
global economic giant. Today, the country is too big to let the region tie its
hands, but still too small to "go global" without caring about the damaging
potential of its neighborhood. Thus, instrumentalizing its cuspness will remain
an essential aspect of its dual foreign policy, as it stays torn between the restric-
tions imposed by geography and its aspiration to global recognition.
Notes
I South Africa, the "S" in the enlarged BRICS, "got the bomb" but dismantled it before
the end olthe Apartheid regime.
2 Elcano Global Presence Index: www.iepg.es/
3 Conelates of War: www.correlatesofwar.org/
4 World Bank: http:/idata.worldbank.org/
5 See: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/brazillindex_en.htm (retrieved December
I 5, 2009).
6 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament.
Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership (COM (2007) 281), Brussels, 30 May 2007.
See: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relationlbrazil/docVcomOT_281_en,pdf (retrieved
December 15,2009).
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